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What a privilege and delight it was to welcome the participants to this
conference.  I am deeply grateful to the outside commentators, Bill 
Edmundson, John Finnis, Michael Steven Green, Mark Greenberg, Fred 
Schauer, and Larry Solum, for contributing so generously.  My thanks 
also go to the many faculty colleagues who joined in the celebration, and 
particularly to Larry Alexander for convening the event and leading the 
proceedings, as he so often does, and does so well.
This response to the insightful commentaries on Law’s Evolution and 
Human Understanding1 grows out of three propositions: law comes first, 
law is signals, law is of human community.  These propositions underlie 
* © 2014 Laurence Claus. Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  I am 
grateful to Larry Alexander for his comments on this response. 
















   




     
the book’s attempt to address “the three recurrent issues” that H.L.A.
Hart identified at the heart of debates about the nature of law: law’s 
relation to morality, law’s relation to force, and the nature of rules.2 
I. LAW COMES FIRST
Before we can locate the actions of “legal institutions,”3 we need to 
know what gives some human activities that character, what imbues 
them with legal identity.  We cannot know what is legal until we know 
what is law. We know what is law when we know what is custom for us. 
Law expresses what is custom for us, including whom we have customs 
of following.  Law precedes and ushers in the systems of government from 
which we receive much more law. 
What lets people contribute to law is their being credentialed as 
lawgivers by existing law.  The reality of leadership, even revolutionary
leadership, depends upon the evolution of community customs, upon 
community response to the assertions of assertive individuals. No one is 
a leader, no one is a lawgiver, unless and until there has evolved a custom of
following her. 
II. LAW IS SIGNALS 
Law is the expression of group customs.  Law is signals, sent through
signs, sounds, and symbols, and a legal system is a signaling system.4 
Legal systems evolve through customs of following leaders that put led 
groups on a fast track to many more customs.  Lawgiving actions are 
communicative actions.  Lawgiving actions may add to the systems of
signals that let us know the likely character of life in our communities. 
Lawgiving actions may signal scope for further elaborative lawgiving by
others, effectively sharing leadership, sharing power, with those others.
Lawgiving actions are the only ones that deserve to be called distinctively 
governmental. We all do law applying, at least to ourselves and often in 
our relations with others. 
2. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 13 (3d ed. 2012). 
3. Cf. Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288 
(2014) (arguing that legal obligations are the subset of our moral obligations that have 
been affected by the actions of “legal institutions”).
4. See  DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 122–59 (1969) 
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III. LAW IS OF HUMAN COMMUNITY 
In human relations, “the law” is always “the law of” a human
community.  Community comes through communication.  We have law 
anywhere humans have conversed with each other enough to form a
group identity.  Law lets us live together in large groups, with many people 
we do not know. Law supplies the information that makes community
growth possible.  When we live with people we do not know, our need to 
distinguish law from other human communications becomes much greater. 
We need to know which of our communications express group custom, 
which of our communications capture what even strangers are likely to 
do and to expect.  We also need many more signals that self-fulfillingly start
up many more customs.  We need intricate interrelationships among those 
sayings, including signals that set up practices of reward for conformity
and punishment for nonconformity, so that the behavior and expectations 
of others become sufficiently predictable to let us interact, to let us live
together, with confidence. That confidence comes from the multifaceted
character of law’s signals, which convey news not only of likely “official” 
reactions to things we might do, but of others’ likely actions and reactions
too.
Identifying these core propositions helps us see more clearly law’s 
relation to our daily decisionmaking about what to do and how to do it, 
including when to follow the law and how to read it. 
IV. LAW AND AUTHORITY 
We use the word authority in a range of related but separate senses.
When we say that words have or are an authority for us, we may mean
that those words are law of some community to which we belong—that 
is, we may use the word authority as a synonym for legality.  When we 
say that a person has or is an authority, we may have in mind some 
potential source of auctoritas, which for the ancient Romans described 
the kind of personal presence that is apt to attract a following.
Accordingly, we may mean that the person is an expert—that she warrants 
our attention because of what she knows. Or we may mean that the 
person is a lawgiver—that she is in government, that she has power, and
warrants our attention because the rest of our community is giving her 
theirs. If that is all we mean, then we are using the word authority as a
synonym for government, as a synonym for systemically signaled power.






     
 
    
   
  
   








    
 
   
  
     








   
  
existing law signals scope for her to act in the way that she is acting, that 
our legal system credentials her to be a lawgiver in the way that she is
trying to be, that her attempted exercise of power is not revolutionary. 
But maybe that is not all we mean.  After all, such synonymous usage 
applies as much to the credentialed acts of officials in oppressive systems
of law and government as it does to the credentialed acts of officials in
liberal democracies.  When we have rejected the idea that lawgivers ever 
have a moral right to be obeyed, might saying that lawgivers have
“authority” still valuably signal something more than the mere fact that
they are lawgivers?  Perhaps saying lawgivers have authority may valuably
mean that those people are morally justified lawgivers.  The word authority, 
used in this way, would convey the idea of power plus moral justification 
for that power’s use. 
Power in a group is an ability to change group custom, to change what 
people in the group will likely do and expect.  Power to change someone’s 
“legal position”5 is an ability to change how people in law’s group will 
likely treat that person, how they will relate to her, what they will expect
of her. Regardless of how a powerholder, a lawgiver, acquired power,
particular instances of the power’s use, of lawgiving, may or may not be
morally justified.  To speak of a “moral power” to change others’ moral
situation6 risks obscuring the fact that whether any particular exercise of
power is morally justified can be discovered only by an individualized
all-things-considered moral judgment at the time of the exercise. The 
moral justification of lawgiving, like the moral justification of all other 
5. Cf. John Finnis, Freedom, Benefit and Understanding: Reflections on Laurence 
Claus’s Critique of Authority, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 896 n.8 (2014) (“In Hohfeldian
terms, authority to make a rule or order creating a legal obligation is a power, and its 
correlative is not a right to be obeyed, or even a duty to obey, but the subjects’
liability—roughly, susceptibility—to have their legal position thereby changed. How is 
it changed?  By the creation of the obligation lawfully and validly specified by the
exercise of power/authority. To whom is the obligation owed?  If to anyone, to all other 
law-abiding citizens, and/or to the intended beneficiaries of the performance of the 
obligation/duty.” (citation omitted)). 
6. Cf. William A. Edmundson, Law’s Evolution and Law as Custom, 51 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 875, 888 (2014) (“Political authority, as traditionally understood, consists 
in a moral power to impose moral duties by mere say-so.  On any workable construal of 
this conception, official utterances of certain officials must satisfy the antecedent of
some true, general moral principle whose consequent is that citizens have a moral duty
they would not otherwise have had.”); see also Stephen Perry, Political Authority and
Political Obligation, in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 72 (Leslie Green & 
Brian Leiter eds., 2013) (“The main conclusion of this chapter is that the value-based
conception of a moral power, which holds, very roughly, that one person has practical 
authority over another if there is sufficient value in the former person’s being able
intentionally to change the normative situation of the latter, is the moral and conceptual 
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human behavior, is instance-specific.  No one who becomes situated to
lead a group receives a mantle of moral justification inside the lining
of his mantle of power.  Even when a lawgiver came to power in a good
way, on every occasion that he considers exercising his power, he is morally 
obliged to ask whether, all things considered, he is morally justified in 
doing as he contemplates.  And even when he is morally justified in issuing 
a law, the moral impact7 of that law on the moral decisionmaking of
people in his community may vary from person to person8 and over time. 
Acts of lawgiving are morally justified piecemeal, and acts of law following 
are morally required or permitted piecemeal.9  When we see that there is
no moral relation of right to be obeyed and duty to obey between law’s 
issuers and law’s audience, we cease to be surprised that there is imperfect 
congruence between when lawgiving is morally justified and when law 
following is morally required.  The gap or asymmetry10 is explained by
the moral independence of the two phenomena.  Decisions by some humans 
about whether and how to use opportunities they have to lead and
decisions by other humans about whether and how to use opportunities 
they have to follow are each individual moments of all-things-considered
moral reasoning.  The two sets of decisions are of course mutually relevant 
—the rightness of trying to issue laws is affected by whether people are
likely to follow and whether following is likely to be the right thing for 
those people to do, and the rightness of trying to follow laws is affected
by whether others are likely to follow and whether lawgivers and laws
were well chosen.  But these considerations are all just factors in the
mix, to be weighed with whatever else is morally relevant to what we do
on a given occasion; we can never prejudge them to determine conclusively
what should later be done.  A source of historic confusion about this was 
the old idea that lawgivers had authority in the now-discredited sense of
a moral right to rule that had built in a moral claim to others’ obedience. 
7. See Greenberg, supra note 3. 
8. See Brian H. Bix, When Law Becomes Morality: Comments on Mark Greenberg’s 
Moral Impact Theory of Law 6–7 (University of Minnesota Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 14-27, 2014) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434075. 
9. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 80 (1986) (describing “a piecemeal
approach to the question of the authority of governments”). 
10. See  LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 53–55 (2001); Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 695–96 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Imposing Rules, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 85, 87 (2005); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. 










   




    
 
 




It would be valuable to use the word authority in a separate sense of 
“morally justified lawgiving” if morally justified lawgiving explained
the morality of law following.  But it does not.  That lawgivers are morally
justified in issuing a law is neither always sufficient, nor always necessary,
to make following that law the right thing to do.  We are all familiar with 
examples of situations where the right thing to do is to break a law that
was justifiably made, such as breaking speed limits in emergencies.  And
equally, the right thing to do will sometimes be to follow a law that was 
unjustifiably made, such as after a tyrant arbitrarily changes routine
procedures for doing routine everyday things.
The service performed by the old idea of authority was to provide a 
source of moral continuity to match the factual continuity of power. 
Power flowed from the fact that across the group and over time we were 
mostly doing, and expecting others to do, what the leader said.  Authority
supposedly supplied moral support for this group dynamic.  The claim of 
authority was that we were continuously obliged to do what we were
mostly doing anyway.  Having authority was supposed to be potentially
a durable and discoverable status, just as having power is potentially a
durable and discoverable status. Authority was supposed to be a feature 
of power, and to demarcate ex ante, for both the prospective lawgiver’s
benefit and ours, the range of possible laws that we would be morally
bound to obey.  The reason we historically talked so much about authority 
was because we thought it could fulfill this function, that it could give us 
this guidance. A concept of authority that is coextensive with no one’s
power, and not clear ex ante about its own extent, and not in itself the 
answer to when we should follow, is of no use to the powerful, and of 
little use to anyone else.  Perhaps citing its absence has rhetorical value 
when condemning bad leaders, but arguing about the incidence of authority 
is fighting on their prefabricated turf.  Why shouldn’t our discourse focus
directly and explicitly on our real moral reasons for paying attention to 
law and lawgivers? 
V. LAW AND MORAL REASONING
Existing law is an informational input to moral decisionmaking, not a 
subset of it and not a substitute for it. Law’s rules do not exist to relieve 
us from moral reasoning.  Law’s rules exist to inform us about each
other, about what is likely to be done and expected in our community. 
Rules are vehicles for understanding each other, at least enough to let us 
live together in the ways that law’s words contemplate.  Discovering that 
a saying expresses a “valid legal obligation” inside our community does
not conclusively settle what we should do, but is clearly relevant to 
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about likely actual behavior and actual expectation among people in 
law’s community.  That information morally belongs inside our all-things-
considered moral reasoning about what to do each day. 
Having a community depends on having a legal system, and having a 
legal system depends on most members mostly doing as the system
signals.  The self-fulfilling character of legal systems supplies a distinctive
reason for community members to “follow the law.”  That reason is
additional to the various other moral reasons to act that do not always
exist when there is law and that may exist even without law, such as 
coordination for good ends and following expert advice for good ends. 
The weight of having the system as a distinct moral reason will vary from
one life decision to the next, depending on what effect nonconformity
would have on the system and how valuable to human flourishing the 
system really is. The value of our legal systems is always a relevant 
consideration when deciding whether to conform to their signals.  And 
when we are deciding whether to follow any of our communities’ many
laws that manifestly promote the common good, our moral duty to do so
will usually be overdetermined, and the good of maintaining the legal 
system will just pile on, superfluously supporting the morality of our
conformity.
Custom is at the core of every community, from a social club to a 
“state.” Maintaining the scope for shared understanding that lets community
live is a morally relevant consideration when deciding how to act inside
any community, but is a morally overriding or preemptive consideration 
in none of them.  The choice to call a particular community “the state”
should not change how we approach life choices inside it.  For example,
individual decisions to use force remain matters for individual moral 
judgment, and are not immunized from potential wrongfulness by state 
endorsement, nor necessarily rendered wrongful by state condemnation. 
Law’s value to us in curtailing wrongful exercises of force is, however, 
certainly one of its greatest potential accomplishments.  The accomplishment 
comes, when it does, primarily through law’s effectiveness at self-fulfillingly
signaling how and by whom force will be used against those who use it 
wrongly.
Lawgivers should try to avoid telling people to do the wrong thing.
And so should we all.  All of us should try to avoid misleading others 
into doing less well than they could.  Lawgivers should strive to achieve 
the common good through their words, and that is one context for realizing 





























ends and not for evil ones.  That our moral obligations in using language 
require its use for good does not stop us noticing that the way language
helps us do good (or evil) is by helping us understand each other.  And 
law, as a subset of language use, helps us understand what is likely to be 
true even of people with whom we never directly speak, because law lets
us know what is customary in the groups to which we together belong.
VI. LAW AND EXPECTATION 
Sometimes we say someone “expects” us to behave in a certain way
when we believe that the person will hold us to a particular moral 
standard of behavior.  Notice that this use of expect need not imply any
actual belief by the “expecting” person that the “expected” behavior is 
likely to occur.  People use expect in this way (“I expect you to behave”) 
to influence and increase the probability that other people will behave in 
the indicated way.  By saying “I expect you to behave” in way X, the 
speaker seeks to increase the probability that the hearers will behave in
way X by implying that the speaker will react adversely (at least with 
disapproval) if the indicated behavior is not forthcoming.  When someone 
sees reason to say “I expect you to behave,” that reason resides in doubt 
about whether the behavior will be forthcoming and a felt need to bolster 
the probability of its occurrence.  In other words, people say “I expect
you to behave” when they want to be able to expect behavior and are unsure 
whether they can. 
What distinguishes law from all the other sayings through which people 
seek to influence each other’s behavior?  Law lets us have community-
wide actual expectations, actual perceptions of high probability that 
behavior will occur within the group. Law self-fulfillingly signals what 
people in law’s community will likely actually believe is (a) likely to
occur and (b) likely to be thought likely by everyone else in that community. 
How does “expectation” relate to moral obligation? When people say 
“I expect you to behave” in way X, they often mean to convey that they
think X is how their hearers should behave, all things considered.  The “I 
expect” adds to “you should” by importing the moral significance of the 
interpersonal relation between speaker and hearer, and implying 
consequences for that relationship if the hearer fails to behave in the 
indicated way. Where words are law for a group, the moral significance 
of the group relationship is a correspondingly relevant moral consideration
for someone deciding whether to conform to the actual group expectations 
that law’s words self-generate.  When we value belonging to a group, we
have reason to avoid actions that might make less effective the system of
communications that lets group members form actual expectations, actual
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actions and beliefs.  Feeding the feedback loop that lets us have law, that 
lets us live together in a large group with many people we do not know
personally, is a reason that deserves to be considered whenever we are
deciding whether to conform to law. 
We can easily see the value to our lives of the actual expectations that 
law helps us have, the actual confidence we acquire from law about what 
strangers will likely do at an intersection or in a commercial transaction,
and about what they will likely believe about us, about our likely actions 
and beliefs. This is what lets us live together.  Human community exists 
through and is defined by its customs.  Having the system that lets these 
expectations form and flourish is a moral reason for conformity in any
instance where nonconformity might make a difference.  Whether our 
conformity to law makes a difference to the overall effectiveness of the 
legal system always deserves to be considered.  And where we conclude
that conformity might make a difference to the system, that becomes a
reason, albeit one of finite and relative weight, that joins all the other 
reasons that we must weigh when deciding what to do each day.  Often
some of those other reasons will also be about meeting expectations,
namely the expectations that evolve distinctively through our individual
interpersonal relations. 
VII. LAW AND CUSTOM 
Law self-generates the sources of its future self.  Law self-generates
social facts—facts about what people in law’s community are likely to
do and to expect, including facts about whose words everyone is likely
to treat as additional news of what people are likely to do and to expect. 
Our customs of following leaders sprout branches of further following as 
leaders “delegate” or “cede” aspects of leadership to others, expanding 
our communities’ networks of signalers and signals.  Primary shared 
understandings about who is leader can metamorphose over generations 
into shared psychological support for the legality of complex systems of 
signals that symbiotically sustain elaborate structures of interrelated
institutions. 
Once we see the customary foundations of our legal systems, we can 
also see that our customs of following leaders may well share space with
other foundational customs.  If we want to appreciate law’s full contribution
to defining human community and letting us understand each other’s
likely behaviors and expectations, we need to supplement the news we get 

















    
  
 
    
   
 
   




be difficult to do; it may require quite a lot of “asking around.”  Among
the great social benefits of formal legal systems that evolve through our
customs of following leaders is their efficiency at conveying legal 
information through readily researchable sources of “pedigreed” signals.
Finding out in what ways a community’s customs of following leaders,
of conforming to formal law, are qualified and cut down by other customs, 
is much easier when we have been living awhile inside the group.  How 
do we find out about those other customs?  Sometimes just by observing 
patterns of behavior, but often by actually talking about them.
Law is the expression of our customs in the full sense.  Law includes
not only the systems of pedigreed signals that evolve through our customs 
of following leaders, but also all of the other sayings among ourselves 
that accurately express patterns of group behavior and expectation.  Our 
everyday learning about law rarely involves consulting the actual text of
formal regulations. Most of the law we live by is law we learn through 
relevantly accurate paraphrasing, whether picked up from parents or
from schools or from websites. 
Law is all accurate expression of our customs, including pedigreed 
phraseology we get from systemically credentialed signalers and all true 
synonyms for that phraseology that we employ among ourselves to spread
the word about what is custom for us and all the sayings that accurately 
express customs we have evolved without the aid of our current formal
legal systems.  Some of our “informal” customs may have long histories, 
perhaps even longer than the histories of our current formal systems.  Some
may go back further than any eye can see; others may be traceable to one of
our formal systems’ antecedents.  When we experience revolutionary change
in our formal legal systems, many ways of doing things may survive even
though they were started up by sayings of leaders long since deposed.
Our informal customs may evolve in tandem with our formal legal 
systems, interacting with and taking account of those systems’ content in 
various ways.  For example, we may have a custom of traveling no more 
than ten miles per hour faster than whatever the formal system signals 
for maximum speeds.  The custom will be discernible to anyone inside 
the community from some combination of her experience on the road
and her conversations with other insiders.  She may pick it up by noticing
what speeds other drivers are doing and which drivers are actually being 
pulled over by the police.  Or she may pick it up even sooner by being 
told about it.  If she ever becomes relevantly situated to be a lawgiver, her 
decisions about what formal speed limits to set will be made with an eye 
on the customs that shape the way her community will likely react to her
words. 
Our informal customs may also flatly contradict and fully neutralize




























[VOL. 51:  953, 2014] Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
instances, our leaders discover that our customs of treating them as leaders 
just do not extend to those matters. The book gives as an example a 
European state whose formal leadership dutifully purports to regulate
cheese and sausage making in ways that accord with new European 
Union directives.11  If over time we find that cheese and sausage makers
ignore the regulations and persist in using their traditional methods, and 
no one forcibly stops them, we might conclude that the community’s 
custom of following its formal leaders just does not extend to cheese and
sausage making, however much that leadership is effective in other 
respects.  If the formal regulatory words about cheese and sausage making 
stay on the statute books, we might conclude that those words have a 
legal status comparable to an unrepealed statute that the courts have held 
unconstitutional.  And just as courts can change their minds about whether a
statute is unconstitutional and resuscitate it by overruling themselves, so 
informal community custom can change in ways that resuscitate regulatory 
words that had hitherto been disregarded. 
Recognizing law’s descriptive character assimilates our use of the word
about human relations to our use of the word about the rest of the natural 
world. John Stuart Mill thought the two uses wholly distinct.12  In  
H.L.A. Hart’s approving account, Mill saw a 
perennial confusion between laws which formulate the course or regularities of
nature, and laws which require men to behave in certain ways.  The former, 
which can be discovered by observation and reasoning, may be called ‘descriptive’ 
and it is for the scientist thus to discover them; the latter cannot be so established, for
they are not statements or descriptions of facts, but are ‘prescriptions’ or
demands that men shall behave in certain ways.13 
In fact, the law of a human community expresses the course or regularities
of that community and may be discovered by observation and reasoning.
We communicate among ourselves about the laws of science to understand
the world better—to understand how the physical world around us is 
likely to act and to react in our encounters with it.  We communicate
among ourselves about the laws of our community to understand each
other better—to understand how people in our group are likely to act and
to react in our encounters with each other.  If a “law” of science fails to 
11. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 160–61. 
12. JOHN STUART MILL, Nature, in THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION 3 (2d ed. 1874). 
13. HART, supra note 2, at 187 (commenting on JOHN STUART MILL, Nature, in 














     
 
   




describe accurately, it ceases to be seen as law.  And that is just as true
for the “law” of a human community that fails to describe what people in 
that community are likely to do and to expect.  Law describes a regularity 
and successfully predicts the continuation of that reality.  Words that fail 
to describe and to predict accurately do not fulfill for us law’s function. 
Mill’s error was not seeing the element of nature that “human” law
successfully describes.  Our law describes the character of our community, 
not the isolated behaviors of individuals.  A difference between human 
law and scientific law is, however, that when we describe ourselves, we
affect how we think of ourselves, and how we think of ourselves affects 
who we are. Human law’s descriptions contribute to their own truth. 
VIII. LAW AND PREDICTION 
What turns some people’s sayings in some settings into the law of a 
group?  A widely shared understanding within the group that the sayings 
have self-fulfilling effect, that the sayings succeed in communicating 
what people in the group are likely to do and to expect, that the sayings 
both express and help constitute group custom.  This one characteristic is 
both necessary and sufficient to let us call those sayings law.  It is not
necessary that the lawgiver intend the self-fulfilling effect, not necessary
that the lawgiver intend to be a lawgiver.  A community may latch onto 
words that came from someone who had no intention of being a lawgiver, 
no intention to instruct, direct, order, command the group of people who
are treating his words as law. In other words, it is possible, though unusual,
to lead involuntarily.  The sayings of revered religious figures may acquire 
legal status in a group without those figures harboring any aspirations to 
leadership.  Of course, in fact, most lawgivers do intend to be lawgivers— 
they intend to instruct, direct, order, command, and they expect their words
to have self-fulfilling effect inside the community to whom those words 
are directed because they can see that they are being treated as lawgivers 
by that community.  Only the self-fulfilling group effect of lawgivers’
words, not their directive character, is necessary to law.  And only the
self-fulfilling group effect is distinctive to law.  When we say that a lawgiver
is instructing or directing or ordering or commanding, we can notice that 
she might take a similar tone with people in other settings that no one
would ever call lawgiving, such as when buying goods and services. We
often tell other people to do or not do things, without giving them law in the
process. Intending to be directive is not only insufficient to be lawgiving, it
is also neither a necessary feature of lawgiving nor a distinctive feature of
lawgiving.
“Retroactive” laws help us see that being directive is not essential to 
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expectation, not duty-imposing direction.  To announce that people’s
duty requires behaving in a way never mentioned before and that they
have already disobeyed if they did not behave that way in the past is 
absurd. But in fact, retroactive laws are not absurd. They just resemble
laws that predict consequences for other unalterable attributes, such as
age. Whether a lawgiver is morally justified in newly signaling adverse 
consequences for past conduct is a question for all-things-considered
moral judgment.  Much that we value in the common law emerged through 
decisions resolving disputes that newly announced legal liabilities for 
actions that people had already done.
Oliver Wendell Holmes advanced our understanding of the nature of 
law and lawgiving when he identified self-fulfilling effect in a group as 
law’s essential feature, calling it systematized prediction.14  That was an
innovation.  It was also an insight.  It told us a truth we had missed.  And
in the wake of that innovative insight, we can see that lawgivers’ self-
understandings about what they are doing are not an essential element of
lawgiving.  As to Holmes’s self-understanding, he called statutes and law
reports part of a “body of dogma or systematized prediction.”15  His self-
understanding was that the essence of what he was accomplishing through 
his official words was self-fulfilling prediction.  Over the century since 
Holmes’s celebrated characterization, lawgivers who have wondered
what affords their words unique social significance have had access to
an articulate answer: systematized prediction. 
Why has Holmes’s self-understanding not been more overtly shared 
among lawgivers?  We have long and widely appreciated law’s predictive
value, so why has our rhetoric characterizing law and lawgiving not 
adequately reflected the centrality to those phenomena of systematized
prediction? We find an answer when we notice the role that claims of 
14. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457–58 
(1897).
15. Id. (“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.  The means of the
study are a body of reports, of treatises, and of statutes, in this country and in England, 
extending back for six hundred years, and now increasing annually by hundreds. In
these sibylline leaves are gathered the scattered prophecies of the past upon the cases in
which the axe will fall.  These are what properly have been called the oracles of the law. 
Far the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of every new effort of legal 
thought is to make these prophecies more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly 
connected system. . . . I wish, if I can, to lay down some first principles for the study of 






   





















     
  
rights to rule have played in our politics over much of human history.
We have talked about rights to lead not merely to consider what morally
justifies people in attempting acts of lawgiving.  Rather, in talking about
rights to lead, the well-situated among our ancestors were often in the 
business of persuading their populations of a moral duty to obey particular
people, continuously over time.  They claimed that particular people were
morally entitled to occupy particular lawgiving roles for particular periods 
of time to the exclusion of rival aspirants, and that the rest of us owed a
correlative duty to those people to treat them as lawgivers, self-fulfillingly 
making them so. 
As we now more widely see and say, our real moral reasons for treating 
people as lawgivers are not about what we owe them, but about what we 
owe ourselves and each other as people living together in community. 
And among the things we owe each other is doing what we can to maintain 
law’s way of letting us live together unless we have morally weightier
reasons to do differently.  But it is hardly surprising that so much of our 
historic discourse about the nature of law and lawgiving was dominated
by the dominant, and that so many of our leaders and their senior
subordinates favored framing the moral landscape as about what we 
owed leaders.  The priorities of our politics, and of our political theorizing,
were too often the priorities of squabbling, self-serving elites.16 
Our rhetorical framework for talking about law and government, 
including the language of authority and of duty to obey, does not come 
from a conventionalist understanding of the legal system.  We inherited
that framework from our long history of trying to locate rights in leaders.  
Contemporary legal theory has tried to graft a conventionalist account of
systemic foundations onto a framework for legal discourse that developed
from quite different premises about how we have law.  Had we always
understood law as the expression of our customs, we would doubtless 
have talked about it differently.
IX. LAW AND INTERPRETATION 
We read law not to understand lawgivers, but to understand each other. 
We read law much as we read the rules of a game.  Our purpose is not to 
obey an author; our purpose is to play satisfyingly with other would-be 
players.  What we need to know when we read law is how others in our
community are reading it, regardless of what the author intended.  The 
extent of law’s success in shaping how we live together depends on the
16. See KARL R. POPPER, 1 THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF 
PLATO 121 (4th ed. rev., Harper & Row 1963) (1945) (criticizing our historic theoretical
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extent to which we are able to share an understanding of it across the 
group and over time. 
The possibility of a shared and continuous public meaning is built into 
the possibility of law, though both the sharing and the continuity will 
always be matters of degree.  When we consider controversies about 
constitutional interpretation, we can notice that no constitutional court in 
the world actually claims for its opinions a higher legal status or greater 
legal effect than the constitution under which the court is constituted. 
And no constitutional court in the world thinks that those in the audience 
for its words, we the receivers of constitutional court opinions, should
each read those words to mean whatever we personally think it would 
have been best for the constitutional court to have written.  We might
therefore ask: should the words of constitutions constrain constitutional 
courts in the way that those courts take for granted the courts’ words 
constrain everyone else? 
The wide-ranging lawgiving in which the United States Supreme 
Court has engaged when deciding what the United States Constitution 
requires has in many instances followed predictably from the American 
community’s custom of living under a document that is old, abstract, and
moral.  That combination of traits opens up substantial scope for disputes
about meaning that can be resolved only by further elaborative lawgiving of
a kind that the Constitution itself contemplates.  The possibility of shared
and continuous meaning remains intrinsic to law, and sets boundaries on
the scope of constitutionally contemplated elaborative lawgiving.  The 
good of having the legal system calls for us all to do our best to read our 
existing law the same way, so that it can be for us a source of shared
understanding across the community and over time.  Our need of that 
shared understanding is partly why lawyers are in such demand.  Ronald
Dworkin’s Judge Hercules’ contributions to the law would be lost to us 
if we lacked a shared understanding of the words through which he 
expressed himself. His words would not help us know what to expect of
each other if we were not reading them the same way.  His words would
not be law for us. 
Where there is a discernible public meaning in our shared language 
that lets law guide across the community and over time, reading law to
mean something else is revolutionary.  If a revolutionary reading catches
on, we have an actual mini-revolution.  Revolution is any unpredicted
turn in a legal system’s evolution, any success in changing law outside




















behavior deserves to be called illegitimate depends on whether, all 
things considered, it is morally justified.  The United States Constitution 
became law in a revolutionary way, outside the scope for legal change 
signaled in the existing Articles of Confederation.  Lawgivers who issue
rules of change have moral reason to seek an optimal balance between
the benefits of stable expectations and the benefits of responsiveness to
new insights and experience.  If later lawgivers think their predecessors
got that balance wrong, the value of stable expectations deserves to weigh 
heavily in their moral calculations about what to do next, because 
revolutionary change poses greater threat than lesser change to our 
community-wide ability to expect of each other.  But acting in a revolutionary
way will sometimes be the right thing to do. And not only for judges. 
Just as Hercules brings an integrated moral vision to deciding what words to
add to the law when resolving disputes about the meaning of existing 
law, so each of us should bring an integrated moral vision to deciding what 
weight to give Hercules’ words (and all the rest of our law) when choosing 
what to do each day. 
We humans argue all the time.  What makes the outcomes of some
arguments lawgiving is that we have customs of letting the say-so of some
humans settle some arguments and signal what our likely behaviors and
expectations will be. Hercules’ words distinctively matter to us in a way
that causes us to call them law and similar sounds coming from an eccentric
on a soapbox not law.  The focus of enquiry into the nature of law therefore 
needs to be on what Hercules’ communicative actions distinctively succeed 
in doing and how they succeed in doing it.  Hercules’ deciding what to 
do, like all of our individual decisions about what to do each day, is a 
matter for all-things-considered moral judgment.  In making those moral 
judgments each day, we reflect on “the people we want to be and the 
community we aim to have.”17  What  existing law contributes to those
judgments are the reasons for action that we get from learning about the
people we already are and the community we already have. 
17. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 413 (1986). 
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